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Abstract
We develop the optimal trading strategy for a foreign exchange (FX) broker who must liqui-
date a large position in an illiquid currency pair. To maximize revenues, the broker considers
trading in a currency triplet which consists of the illiquid pair and two other liquid currency
pairs. The liquid pairs in the triplet are chosen so that one of the pairs is redundant. The
broker is risk-neutral and accounts for model ambiguity in the FX rates to make her strategy
robust to model misspecification. When the broker is ambiguity neutral (averse) the trading
strategy in each pair is independent (dependent) of the inventory in the other two pairs in the
triplet. We employ simulations to illustrate how the robust strategies perform. For a range
of ambiguity aversion parameters, we find the mean Profit and Loss (P&L) of the strategy
increases and the standard deviation of the P&L decreases as ambiguity aversion increases.
Keywords: Foreign Exchange, Currency Pairs, Optimal Liquidation, Execution, Inventory
Aversion, Ambiguity Aversion
1. Introduction
Trading activity in the foreign exchange (FX) market is vast. On average, the daily
turnover is in excess of 5 trillion USD, where approximately a third of this turnover is in the
FX spot market, and the remainder is in FX derivatives: forwards, swaps, and options (see
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BIS (2016)). All currencies are traded in the FX spot market, but most of the turnover is in
a handful of pairs (USD/EUR, USD/JPY, USD/GBP, USD/AUD, USD/CAD). The market
quotes a rate for those who buy (bid) or sell (ask) the currency pair, where the difference
between the ask and the bid prices is the quoted spread and the average of the bid and ask
prices is the mid-exchange rate. A currency pair is traded by simultaneously taking a long
position in one currency and a short position in the other currency of the pair. The conversion
rate between the two currencies is given by the bid (resp. ask) if the investor is going long
(resp. short) the currency pair.
In this paper we show how a broker liquidates a large position in an illiquid currency pair.
One approach is to trade only the pair the broker aims to liquidate. An alternative is for the
broker to trade in three currency pairs, one of which is the illiquid pair and the additional pairs
are such that the three pairs are formed by combinations of only three currencies. Therefore,
by no-arbitrage, one of the currency pairs can be replicated by taking positions in the other
two pairs, and hence the dynamics of the three currency pairs exhibit strong co-movements.
Ideally, at least one of the two additional pairs is very liquid (heavily traded), so this “triangle”
dependence between the pairs is considered by the broker to devise liquidation strategies that
offset the illiquidity in one pair with the two other more liquid pairs.
There is no central Exchange framework in FX, so brokers trade in electronic communi-
cation networks (ECNs) with multiple liquidity providers and via other channels with their
own pool of clients, see Cartea et al. (2015) and Oomen (2017). We refer to the broker’s
trading activities on all ECNs as trading in the ‘Exchange’. The broker can control her own
liquidity taking orders sent to the Exchange, but has little or no control on the arrival rate
of the orders of her clients.
The broker is risk-neutral and acknowledges that her model of mid-exchange rates of the
currency pairs, which is represented by a reference measure P, may be misspecified. She deals
with this model uncertainty, also referred to as ambiguity aversion, by considering alternative
models when she develops the optimal execution strategy, see Cartea et al. (2017) and Cartea
et al. (2016). These alternative models are characterized by probability measures that are
absolutely continuous with respect to the reference model P. The decision to reject the
reference measure is based on a penalty that the broker incurs if she adopts an alternative
model. The magnitude of the penalty depends on the broker’s degree of ambiguity aversion
and is based on a measure of the distance between the reference and the alternative measure.
The broker solves an optimal control problem where the objective is to liquidate a large
position in an illiquid pair, and does by submitting liquidity taking orders to the Exchange
in all three currency pairs. These orders have a temporary impact in the quote currency of
the pair. That is, when the broker executes trades in the Exchange she receives worse rates
than the quoted mid-exchange rate. The broker simultaneously fills orders from her pool of
clients. These orders are filled at the mid-exchange rate and clients pay a service fee to the
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broker, where the size of the fee is proportional to the size of the order in the currency pair.
We show that when the broker is ambiguity neutral, i.e., fully trusts the reference model,
the optimal trading strategy in each currency pair is independent of the level of inventory in
the other two pairs. Thus, the broker’s strategy does not employ the other two currency pairs
of the triplet to optimally execute a position in an illiquid pair. On the other hand, when
the broker is ambiguity averse, the inventory position in each pair affects the trading strategy
in the other two pairs. As the level of ambiguity aversion increases, the speed at which the
strategy builds positions in the liquid pairs of the triplet increases.
We also demonstrate that the ambiguity averse broker makes her model robust to mis-
specification by adopting a candidate measure where the drifts of the mid-exchange rates are
different from those of the reference model. Specifically, when the broker’s initial position in
the illiquid pair is short (resp. long), the broker devises a strategy where the drift in the mid-
exchange rates of the currency pairs in the triplet, relative to the model under the reference
measure P, is larger (resp. smaller). This affects the speed of trading in the robust model,
relative to that of the reference model, because the expected growth in the mid-exchange
rate of the currency pair affects the value of the inventory. For example, if a currency pair is
expected to appreciate, then, everything else being equal, it is optimal to increase the position
in that pair.
We use simulations, based on parameters calibrated to FX data, to illustrate the perfor-
mance of the strategy. Our results show that when the broker makes her model robust to
misspecification, the mean Profit and Loss (P&L) of the strategy increases and the standard
deviation of the P&L decreases.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that shows how FX brokers manage large
positions in currency pairs. Our framework can be extended to FX trading algorithms to make
markets and those designed to take speculative positions in currency pairs with strong co-
dependence. Although the literature on algorithmic trading in the FX market is scant, there
is a large body of work that looks at optimal liquidation, and other algorithmic strategies
in equity markets. For comprehensive treatments of algorithmic trading and microstructure
issues in equity markets see Lehalle and Laruelle (2013), Cartea et al. (2015), Gue´ant (2016),
Abergel et al. (2016).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the broker’s reference
model for the currency pairs and discusses the broker’s cashflows from dealing currency pairs
with her pool of clients and from executing trades in the FX Exchange. Section 3 solves the
control problem for the ambiguity neutral broker. Section 4 shows how the broker introduces
model ambiguity to make the model robust to misspecification and solves the control problem
of the ambiguity averse broker and provides the optimal speed to trade the currency pairs
in the triplet. Section 5 illustrates the performance of the strategy and Section 6 concludes.
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Figure 1: Currencies and exchange rates for pairs in the FX triplet. The quote currency (the start of the
arrow) is sold at the rate shown on the link, and one unit of the base currency (the end of the arrow) purchased.
For example, when the broker goes long the currency pair (2, 1) in a frictionless market, she buys one unit of
the base currency 2 and sells Xt units of quote currency 1.
Finally, some proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2. Model Setup
FX traders buy and sell currency pairs. Trading in a pair of currencies involves the
simultaneous sale of one currency and purchase of another currency and the price at which
this transaction is done is the mid-exchange rate plus (minus) half the quoted spread when
longing (shorting) the pair. In this paper we focus on a triplet of currency pairs that links the
exchange rates of three currencies. We denote the three currencies by {1, 2, 3}, and denote
the mid-exchange rates of the currency pairs by Xt, Yt, and Zt, where t denotes time. Here
Xt is the mid-exchange rate for the pair (2, 1), Yt is the mid-exchange rate for the pair (3, 1),
and Zt is the mid-exchange rate for the pair (2, 3).
When the broker goes long the currency pair (2, 1) in a frictionless market (i.e., no fees
and zero spread), she buys one unit of currency 2, known as the base currency in the pair,
and sells Xt units of currency 1, known as the quote currency in the pair. Similarly, the cost
of one unit of currency 3 is Yt units of currency 1; and the cost of one unit of currency 2 is Zt
units of currency 3. By no-arbitrage, the mid-exchange rates for the reverse direction of the
pairs, i.e., for (1, 2), (1, 3), and (3, 2), are given by 1/Xt, 1/Yt, 1/Zt, respectively. See Figure
1.
One of the three currency pairs is redundant because it can be obtained by simultaneously
executing transactions in the other two pairs. For example, buying one unit of the pair (2, 1)
and buying Xt units of the pair (1, 3), is equivalent to buying one unit of the pair (2, 3). Thus,
by no-arbitrage the mid-exchange rates satisfy
Zt = Xt/Yt . (1)
We focus on a triplet with a redundant currency pair because brokers who need to unwind
positions in highly illiquid currency pairs may rely on the triplet to enhance the financial
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performance of the liquidation strategy. For example, assume that a broker needs to unwind
a position in one illiquid pair only. One approach is to devise an optimal liquidation strategy
based on exclusively trading the illiquid pair. An alternative is to devise a liquidation strategy
where the broker also trades in two other pairs which are more liquid. These two additional
pairs are chosen to form, in conjunction with the illiquid pair, a triangular triplet. The
dynamics of the three pairs exhibit strong co-dependence, and the broker may offset some of
the costs arising from the illiquidity in one pair by taking positions in the other, more liquid,
pairs.
2.1. Mid-exchange rate dynamics
To devise the optimal trading strategy, the broker assumes a model for the dynamics of the
triplet. This model is described by the completed probability space (Ω,F = {Ft}t∈[0,T ],P),
where F is the natural filtration generated by the processes X = (Xt)t∈[0,T ] and Y = (Yt)t∈[0,T ],
which satisfy the stochastic differential equations (SDEs)
dXt = µxXt dt+ σxXt dW
x
t , (2a)
dYt = µy Yt dt+ σy Yt dW
y
t , (2b)
where σx > 0, σy > 0, µx, µy are constants, W
x = (W xt )t∈[0,T ] and W
y = (W yt )t∈[0,T ] are
P–Brownian motions with correlation ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. The dynamics of the mid-exchange rate
Z = (Zt)t∈[0,T ] are implied by the no-arbitrage relationship (1) and are given by the SDE
dZt = µz Zt dt+ σx Zt dW
x
t − σy Zt dW yt , where µz = µx − µy + σ2y − ρ σx σy . (2c)
The exchange rates of the triplet satisfy identity (1) if there are no trading fees, the quoted
spread is zero (i.e., best bid and best ask prices in the LOB are the same), and the market is
arbitrage-free. On the other hand, if the product of the three exchange rates is greater than
one, there is an arbitrage opportunity, see Fenn et al. (2009). For example, assume that Z is
the exchange rate for the pair EUR/USD, Y is for the pair USD/CHF, and X is for the pair
EUR/CHF, and assume that Zbidt Y
bid
t 1/X
ask
t = f , where f > 1. If a trader initially holds
one Euro, the arbitrage consists of: (i) with one Euro purchase Zbidt USD, (ii) which buys Y
bid
t
units CFH, (iii) and sell this position for 1/Xaskt Euros. Clearly, this chain of transactions
will ‘convert’ one Euro into f Euros with no risk.
We could assume that the exchange rate Z is as (2c) plus noise so that the product of
the three rates is a stochastic process which is most of the time below 1 and very seldom
above 1. However, to keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that the product of
the mid-exchange rates of the currency pairs of the triplet is 1 for all t.
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2.2. Speed of trading, order flow, and inventory
We assume the broker uses the Exchange exclusively to take liquidity (i.e., does not provide
liquidity to the Exchange), and provides liquidity to her pool of clients by filling the orders of
clients. Thus, the broker controls the speed at which she trades aggressively in the Exchange,
but cannot control the rate at which she fills the liquidity taking orders of her clients. The
broker trades in the triplet of currencies over the time window [0, T ] and aims at holding zero
inventory in all pairs by the terminal date T . We denote by ν = (νt)t∈[0,T ] the vector-valued
process of execution speeds in the Exchange, for the pairs x, y, z, and write νt = (ν
x
t , ν
y
t , ν
z
t )
ᵀ,
where ᵀ is the transpose operator.
The vector-valued process Qν = (Qνt )t∈[0,T ] represents the controlled inventory in each
currency pair of the triplet, which results from trading in the Exchange and from trading
with her own pool of clients. That is, Qν tracks the units of base currency in each currency
pair – for modelling purposes, it is convenient to use “inventory of currency pair” instead
of “units of base currency” to track trades in different currency pairs that share a common
base currency. At t = 0, the broker’s initial holding in the currency pairs is denoted by
Qν0 = (Q
x,ν
0 , Q
y,ν
0 , Q
z,ν
0 )
ᵀ. To understand our notation (in a frictionless market) if the first
entry of the inventory triplet is Qx0 = 100, then the broker is short 100×X0 units of currency
1 and long 100 units of currency 2. Similarly, if Qx0 = −100 the broker is long 100×X0 units
of currency 1 and short 100 units of currency 2.
When the broker’s initial inventory is Qν0 , her initial portfolio of currency pairs consists of
Qx0 + Q
z
0 units of currency 2, and Q
y
0 units of currency 3. Then, the value of the portfolio in
currency 1 is Qx0 ×X0 +Qy0×Y0 +Qz0×Z0×Y0 in a frictionless market, and in the absence of
arbitrage, the value of the portfolio is Qx0×X0 +Qy0×Y0 +Qz0×X0. As mentioned previously,
two inventory processes, Qx,νt and Q
z,ν
t , track the units of the base currency 2 in the pairs
(2, 1) and (2, 3).
The following example illustrates how the broker’s speed of trading affects inventory.
Assume that over the time step ∆t the strategy is to execute in the Exchange the amount
νxt ∆t > 0 in the currency pair (2, 1). Thus the post-transaction inventory becomes Q
x,ν
t+∆t =
Qx,νt − νxt ∆t. If we further assume that over the time interval (t, t + ∆t] the mid-exchange
rate Xt does not change, then the effect of the execution strategy is to reduce by: ν
x
t ∆t×Xt
the amount the broker is short in currency 1, and νxt ∆t the amount the broker is long in
currency 2.
While the broker’s target is to hold zero units in the base currency of all currency pairs by
the terminal date, i.e., QνT = 0, she continues to fill buy and sell orders of the clients in the
three pairs, and this affects the broker’s inventory. We assume the liquidity taking orders of the
clients arrive according to independent compound Poisson processes. Let Ok,± = (Ok,±t )t∈[0,T ]
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represent the order flow from clients in the currency pair k ∈ {x, y, z}. Specifically,
Ok,±t =
Nk,±t∑
n=1
ξk,±n , (3)
where market sell is denoted by + and market buy is denoted by −. Here, {ξk,±n }n=1,2,... i.i.d.∼
F k,±, where F k,± is the distribution function, with support on [0,∞), of the volume of the
clients’ buy and sell orders in currency pair k. The counting processes Nk,± = (Nk,±t )t∈[0,T ]
are independent Poisson processes with intensities λk,±, and represent the number of market
(buy and sell) orders received by the broker in each currency pair through time. The Poisson
processes, the size of the trades, and the Brownian motions W x,y are all mutually independent.
All distribution functions are under the reference measure P. At this point, we extend the
completed filtered probability space (Ω, F = {Ft}t∈[0,T ], P), so that henceforth, Ft represents
the natural filtration generated by (W x, W y, Ox,±, Oy,±, Oz,±).
For example, when the broker fills a client’s market sell order of volume ξx,+ and there is
no brokerage service fee, the broker’s inventory position in the pair x increases by ξx,+; that
is, the broker has shorted an additional ξx,+×Xt units of currency 1 and longed an additional
ξx,+ units of currency 2.
In all, the broker’s inventory is affected by the controlled executions sent to the Exchange,
and the clients’ filled market orders. The dynamics of the inventory in each pair are given by
Qk,νT = Q
k,ν
t −
∫ T
t
νku du−
∫ T
t
∫
R
r Jk,−(du, dr) +
∫ T
t
∫
R
r Jk,+(du, dr) , (4)
where Jk,± is the jump measure of O±k,t, with intensity measure λ
k,± F k,±(dr) du.
2.3. Temporary mid-exchange rate impact on quote currency
The broker’s trades in the Exchange receive temporary price impact. When the broker
sends executions to the Exchange, she enters a position in the quote currency at a value that
is worse than the quoted mid-exchange rate. For example, if at time t the broker sends to
the Exchange a sell order for r units of the currency pair (2, 1), instead of receiving r × Xt
units of the quote currency 1 (in exchange of r units of the base currency 2), she receives
r × Xt (1 − ax r) units of currency 1 (in exchange of r units of currency 2). The parameter
ax ≥ 0 denotes the temporary impact of the broker’s order for the currency pair (2, 1), i.e.,
the broker’s order walks the FX book of the Exchange. The impact on the mid-exchange rate
is temporary because we assume that liquidity in the Exchange’s order book is immediately
replenished (or replenished faster than the broker submits orders).
On the other hand, when the broker fills buy and sell orders from her clients, the broker
charges a spread around the mid-exchange rates Xt, Yt, Zt. For example, if a client sends a
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sell order of r units in the pair (2, 1) the client receives the rate Xt (1− cx r) r, which is worse
than the mid-exchange rate Xt if cx > 0. We refer to this spread as a brokerage service fee.
2.4. Broker’s marked-to-market cash position
At every instant in time the broker’s cash position is marked-to-market in currency 1
and the cumulative value is denoted by X ν = (X ν)t∈[0,T ]. This cash position results from
the market making activity with her clients, the liquidity taking orders she sends to the FX
Exchange, and is given by
X νT = X νt
+
∫ T
t
[
X̂u ν
x
u + Ŷu ν
y
u + Ẑu ν
z
u
]
du (5a)
+
∫ T
t
∫
R+
X˜+u r J
x,−(du, dr)−
∫ T
t
∫
R+
X˜−u r J
x,+(du, dr) (5b)
+
∫ T
t
∫
R+
Y˜ +u r J
y,−(du, dr)−
∫ T
t
∫
R+
Y˜ −u r J
y,+(du, dr) (5c)
+
∫ T
t
∫
R+
Z˜+u r J
z,−(du, dr)−
∫ T
t
∫
R+
Z˜−u r J
z,+(du, dr) , (5d)
where
X̂t = Xt (1− ax νxt ) , X˜±t = Xt (1± c∓x r) , (6a)
Ŷt = Yt (1− ay νyt ) , Y˜ ±t = Yt (1± c∓y r) , (6b)
Ẑt = Yt Zt (1− az νzt ) , Z˜±t = Yt Zt (1± c∓z r) . (6c)
Recall that ak ≥ 0 is the temporary impact on the mid-exchange rate due to the trades sent
by the broker to the Exchange, and the brokerage service fee parameter c±k ≥ 0 scales with
the order size to obtain the spread the broker charges to her clients.
Line (5a) represents the cash-flows from the broker’s executions in the Exchange when
trading in the three currency pairs and marked-to-market in currency 1. In particular, the
first, second, and third terms are the cash-flows received/paid by the broker when trading
the currency pair (2, 1), (3, 1), and (2, 3), respectively. Recall that a positive execution speed
corresponds to selling the corresponding currency pair, so, e.g., if the execution speed νx is
positive, the broker is selling the pair (2, 1), i.e., sell base currency 2 and purchase quote
currency 1.
Lines (5b) to (5d) represent the cash-flows from the broker’s trading activity with her
pool of clients. For example, line (5b) is the cash-flow from trading currency pair (2, 1) and
marked-to-market in the quote currency 1.
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3. Optimal trading in triplet of currency pairs
In this section we pose and solve the broker’s control problem when the objective is to
liquidate an inventory position in the currency pairs by the terminal date T , and the broker
is confident about the reference model P. The broker maximizes terminal expected wealth
resulting from trading in the Exchange and dealing currency pairs with her clients. The
results in this section are used as a benchmark to compare how the broker’s strategy changes
when the broker acknowledges that the reference model P is misspecified (see Section 4).
3.1. Value function and optimal trading
The broker’s performance criterion is
Hν(t,X ,p, q) = EPt,X ,p,q
[
X νT + ` ((XT , YT ),QνT )
]
, (7)
where p = (x, y), q = (qx, qy, qz),
`(p, q) = x qx (1− αx qx) + y qy (1− αy qy) + x qz (1− αz qz) , αx,y,z ≥ 0 . (8)
The terminal payment `(p, q) denotes the cash proceeds from liquidating any terminal inven-
tory in the Exchange minus a penalty paid by the broker, marked-to-market in currency 1.
The terminal payment includes a penalty of the form αk q
2
k, which consists of fees stemming
from crossing the spread and a non-financial penalty included by the broker to tweak the liq-
uidation strategy. For example, in the absence of order flow from clients, in the limit αk →∞
the optimal strategy guarantees full liquidation by the terminal date. The state variable z
is not included as an argument in the performance criterion because by no-arbitrage it is a
redundant state variable. Finally, note that the broker is risk-neutral because the perfor-
mance criterion (7) optimises expected wealth, i.e., the broker is not sensitive to the risk in
the outcome of terminal wealth.
The broker’s value function is
H(t,X ,p, q) = sup
ν∈V
Hν(t,X ,p, q) (9)
where the set of admissible controls is
V =
{
ν : ν is F -predictable, and EP
[ ∫ T
0
(νs)
2 ds
]
<∞
}
. (10)
To solve the optimal control problem in (9), the dynamic programming principle holds,
and the value function is the unique solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
0 =
(
∂t + Lp + sup
ν
Lν
)
H +
∑
k∈{x,y,z},i=±
∫
R+
∆k,−it,X ,p,q,rH λ
k,i F k,i(dr) , (11a)
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with terminal condition
H(T,X ,p, q) = X + x qx (1− αx qx) + y qy (1− αy qy) + x qz (1− αz qz) , (11b)
where the various operators are defined as follows:
LpH = µx x ∂xH + µy y ∂yH
+ 1
2
σ2x x
2 ∂xxH +
1
2
σ2y y
2 ∂yyH + ρ σx σy x y ∂xyH ,
(12a)
LνH =
∑
k∈{x,y,z}
[
− ak k̂ ∂XH (νk)2 + (k̂ ∂XH − ∂qkH) νk
]
(12b)
∆k,+t,X ,p,q,rH(t,X ,p, q) =H(t,X + k˜+ r,p, q − r 1k)−H(t,X ,p, q) , (12c)
∆k,−t,X ,p,q,rH(t,X ,p, q) =H(t,X − k˜− r,p, q + r 1k)−H(t,X ,p, q) , (12d)
k̂ = k 1{k∈{x,y}} + x 1{k=z}, 1x = (1, 0, 0)ᵀ, 1y = (0, 1, 0)ᵀ, 1z = (0, 0, 1)ᵀ, and k˜± ∈ {x˜, y˜, z˜}
denotes the mid-exchange rates defined in (6).
Proposition 1. The DPE (11a) admits the solution
H(t,X ,p, q) = X + x (qx + qz) + y qy − hx0(t)x− hy0(t) y − hx1(t)x qx
− hy1(t) y qy − hz1(t)x qz − hx2(t)x (qx)2 − hy2(t) y (qy)2 − hz2(t)x (qz)2 ,
(13)
where hx,y,z2 (t), h
x,y,z
1 (t), h
x,y
0 (t) are deterministic functions of time given explicitly in (57),
(59), (61).
For a proof see Appendix A.
Theorem 2. If |µk̂| < |αk/ak|, then the value function of problem (9) is given by (13) and
the controls ν∗ are optimal and are given componentwise by
νk,∗t =
1
2 ak
(
hk1(t) + 2h
k
2(t)Q
k,ν∗
t
)
, k ∈ {x, y, z} , (14)
where hk1,2(t) are provided in (57) and (59).
For a proof see Appendix B. From the above theorem, one sees that the optimal strategy does
not have any cross effects. That is, the speed of execution in one pair is independent of the
inventory held in the other two pairs.
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As a result of Theorem 2, when Qx0 = 0, Q
y
0 = 0, Q
z
0 6= 0, µx = 0, µy = 0, λx,± = 0
and λx,± = 0, the ambiguity neutral broker will only trade currency pair (2, 3) – recall
that in our model, an ambiguity neutral broker is equivalent to a risk-neutral one. Another
observation is that the optimal trading strategy does not depend on mid-exchange rates and
is a deterministic function of time if there are no orders from clients. However, below we
show that the ambiguity averse broker will always trade the three currency pairs of the triplet
regardless of the initial inventory and drift of the mid-exchange rates.
The following proposition shows the execution strategy as the terminal date approaches
and the terminal liquidation penalty is arbitrarily large.
Proposition 3. (i) When λk,± = 0, the optimal trading strategy remains admissible in the
limit as the terminal inventory penalty parameter αk → +∞ (for k ∈ {x, y, z}). Moreover,
near the end of the trading horizon, we have
lim
αk→+∞
νk,∗t = (T − t)−1Qk,ν
∗
t + o(T − t) , (15)
which results in complete liquidation of all inventories by T .
(ii) When the arrival rate of the orders from clients is positive, i.e., λk,± > 0, the optimal
trading strategy is not admissible in the limit as αk → +∞ (for k ∈ {x, y, z}).
For a proof see Appendix C.
4. Ambiguity Aversion on the Mid-Exchange Rates
The broker assumes that the dynamics of the three currency pairs are given by the reference
measure P, see SDEs (2a)-(2c). However, the broker is not fully confident about the reference
model for the mid-exchange rates, so she considers alternative measures to make the model
robust to misspecification, see Cartea et al. (2017). This ambiguity about model choice, or
model uncertainty, has an effect on the optimal strategy employed by the broker when trading
in the three currency pairs. We incorporate this ambiguity about model choice in two steps.
First, we characterize alternative measures that describe the mid-exchange rate dynamics,
and then we determine how the broker decides between employing the reference measure P
or one of the alternative measures.
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The broker considers candidate measures Q that are equivalent to P and characterized by
the Radon-Nikodym derivative
dQ(κ)
dP
= exp
{
1
2
∫ T
0
κᵀu ρ
−1 κu du+
∫ T
0
κᵀu ρ
−1 dW κu
}
, (16)
where ρ =
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
]
, and κ = ((κxt , κ
y
t )
ᵀ)t∈[0,T ] is a two-dimensional F -adapted process.
We denote by Q the class of alternative measures
Q =
{
Q(κ) | κ is F − adapted and EP
[
exp
{
1
2
∫ T
0
κᵀu ρ
−1 κu du
}]
<∞
}
,
and write
dXt =Xt (µx dt+ σx κ
x
t dt+ σx dW
x,κ
t ) , (17a)
dYt =Yt (µy dt+ σy κ
y
t dt+ σy dW
y,κ
t ) , (17b)
dZt =Zt ((µz + σx κ
x
t − σy κyt ) dt+ σx dW x,κt − σy dW y,κt ) , (17c)
where W x,y,κ = (W x,y,κt )t∈[0,T ] are Q(κ)-Brownian motions, and [W x,κ,W y,κ]t = ρ t, ρ ∈
[−1, 1 ].
Next, the broker penalizes deviations from the reference measure using the relative entropy
from t to T , i.e.,
Ht,T (Q |P) = EQt
[
log
((
dQ
dP
)
T
/(
dQ
dP
)
t
)]
. (18)
Note that Ht,T (Q(κ) |P) ≥ 0 and Ht,T (Q(κ) |P) = 0 if and only if κ = 0, i.e., if and only if
Q(κ) = P almost surely.
4.1. Performance criterion and value function
As before, the broker’s aim is to liquidate the position in the currency pairs by the terminal
date T while maximizing expected terminal wealth and considering candidate models that
are penalized using relative entropy. The broker’s performance criterion is
Hν(t,X ,p, q) = inf
Q∈Q
{
EQt,X ,p,q [ X νT + `((XT , YT ),QνT ) ] + 1ϕ Ht,T (Q |P)
}
, (19)
where `(p, q) is as in (8) and recall that p = (x, y), q = (qx, qy, qz).
Here the parameter ϕ is a non-negative constant that represents the broker’s degree of am-
biguity aversion. If the broker is confident about the reference measure P, then the ambiguity
aversion parameter ϕ is small and any deviation from the reference model is very costly. In
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the extreme ϕ→ 0, the broker is very confident about the reference measure, so she chooses
P because the penalty that results from rejecting the reference measure is too high. Thus,
when ϕ → 0, the broker is ambiguity neutral and the problem is equivalent to solving the
value function in (9) discussed above when the broker is risk-neutral.
On the other hand, if the broker is very ambiguous about the reference model, considering
alternative models results in a very small penalty. In the extreme ϕ → ∞, deviations from
the reference model are costless, so the broker considers the worst case scenario.
One can also assume that the broker is risk-averse and employs the performance criterion
Hν(t,X ,p, q) = EPt,X ,p,q
[
U (X νT + ` ((XT , YT ),QνT ))
]
,
where, as above, p = (x, y), q = (qx, qy, qz) and `(p, q) is as in (8). Here, U( · ) is the
broker’s utility function, which is concave. If the utility function is linear, we obtain the
risk-neutral performance criterion in (9) discussed above. In general, when U is concave,
the broker’s problem becomes more difficult to solve. We note, however, that under certain
assumptions, ambiguity aversion and exponential utilities are equivalent, see e.g., Schweizer
(2010) for details.
4.1.1. The dynamic programming equation
The broker’s value function is
H(t,X ,p, q) = sup
ν∈V
Hν(t,X ,p, q) , (20)
where the set of admissible controls is as in (10). To solve the optimal control problem in
(20), the dynamic programming principle holds, and the value function is the unique viscosity
solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) equation
0 =
(
∂t + Lp + sup
ν
Lν + inf
κ
Lκ
)
H +
∑
k∈{x,y,z},i=±
∫
R+
∆k,−it,X ,p,q,rH λ
k,i F k,i(dr) , (21a)
with terminal condition
H(T,X ,p, q) = X + x qx (1− αx qx) + y qy (1− αy qy) + x qz (1− αz qz) , (21b)
where Lp, Lν , and ∆k,±t,X ,p,q,r are given in (12a)–(12d),
LκH = κᵀDH + 1
2ϕ
κᵀ ρ−1 κ , and DH = (σx x ∂xH, σy y ∂yH)ᵀ .
In the following proposition we show that the optimal trading speed does not depend on
the cash position.
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Proposition 4. Write the value function as
H(t,X ,p, q) = X + H(t,p, q) . (22)
Then, from (22) and the HJBI (21), the function H satisfies
0 = (∂t + Lp + G1 + G2) H +
∑
k∈{x,y,z},i=±
∫
R+
(
i k˜i + ∆k,−it,X ,p,q,rH
)
λk,i F k,i(dr), (23a)
subject to the terminal condition
H(T,p, q) = x qx (1− αx qx) + y qy (1− αy qy) + x qz (1− αz qz) , (23b)
and the operators G1 and G2 act as follows:
G1 H =
∑
k∈{x,y,z}
(k̂ − ∂qkH)2
4 ak k̂
, (24a)
G2 H = − ϕ2
(
σ2x x
2 (∂xH)
2 + σ2y y
2 (∂yH)
2 + 2 ρ σx σy x y ∂xH ∂yH
)
. (24b)
Furthermore, the optimal speed of trading in feedback form is
νk,∗ = 1
2 ak k̂
(k̂ − ∂qkH) , (25)
and the optimal measure in feedback form is
κ∗ = −ϕ
1 ρ
ρ 1
 σx x ∂xH
σy y ∂yH
 . (26)
Proof. Substitute (22) into (21a) and maximize the term LνH to obtain the optimal trading
speed (25). As this term is quadratic in ν (with negative quadratic coefficient), it is trivial
to verify that the supremum ν∗ satisfies the first order condition (FOC) in (25). Similarly,
we obtain (26) by the FOC of the LκH term in (21a), which is quadratic in κ with positive
coefficients for (κx)2 and (κy)2, thus we obtain the minimizer κ∗. Then, by substituting (22),
(25), and (26) into (21) results in (23). 
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4.2. Expansion with respect to the ambiguity parameter ϕ
The HJBI (21) is nonlinear and we cannot obtain a solution in closed-form. We employ
perturbation methods, similar to those used by Lorig and Sircar (2016) and Fouque et al.
(2017) in portfolio optimization problems, to approximate the value function with the expan-
sion
H(t,X ,p, q) = X +H0(t,p, q) + ϕH1(t,p, q) + ε(t,p, q) . (27)
By construction, we anticipate that ε is o(ϕ) (see discussion after Proposition 8), and in the fol-
lowing propositions we provide closed-form solutions for the terms H0(t,p, q) and H1(t,p, q).
Proposition 5. In the limit ϕ ↓ 0, the value function of the ambiguity averse broker H(t,X ,p, q)→
X +H0(t,p, q), where
H0(t,p, q) = x (q
x + qz) + y qy − hx00(t)x− hy00(t) y − hx01(t)x qx − hy01(t) y qy
− hz01(t)x qz − hx02(t)x (qx)2 − hy02(t) y (qy)2 − hz02(t)x (qz)2 ,
(28)
hx,y00 (t) = h
x,y
0 (t), h
x,y,z
01 (t) = h
x,y,z
1 (t), h
x,y,z
02 (t) = h
x,y,z
2 (t) are deterministic functions, and
hx,y0 (t), h
x,y,z
1 (t), h
x,y,z
2 (t) are in the appendix, see (57), (59), (61).
Proof. It is straightforward to see from Proposition 4, that as ϕ ↓ 0, (23) reduces to the
PDE for the ambiguity neutral case in (11), and the result follows from Proposition 1.
Proposition 6. Let H(t,X ,p, q) be as in the expansion (27), then H1(t,p, q) satisfies
0 = (∂t + Lp)H1 −
∑
k∈{x,y,z}
k̂−∂
qk
H0
2 ak k̂
∂qkH1
+
∑
k∈{x,y,z},i=±
∫
R+
∆k,−it,X ,p,q,rH1 λ
k,i F k,i(dr)− 1
2
DHᵀ0 ρDH0 ,
(29)
with terminal condition H1(T,p, q) = 0.
Proof. Substitute expansion (27) into (21), expand to first order in ϕ, use the fact that H0
satisfies (11), and equate the result to zero to obtain (29). 
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Note that given H0, the equation in (29) is a linear PIDE. Thus we use a Feynman-Kac
probabilistic representation to write the solution of H1:
H1(t,p, q) =
∫ T
t
Et,p,q
[(−1
2
DHᵀ0 ρDH0
)
(u,Xu, Yu,Qu)
]
du . (30)
The term DH0 can be computed explicitly from (28), and here Qt = (Qxt ,Qyt ,Qzt )ᵀ are
independent auxiliary processes that satisfy the SDEs
dQkt = βk(t,Q
k
t ) dt−
∫
R
rJk,−(dr, dt) +
∫
R
rJk,+(dr, dt) , k ∈ {x, y, z} , (31)
with the function
βk(t, q) = − 12 ak
(
hk01(t) + 2h
k
02(t) q
)
.
Based on the form of (28) and (30), we propose the ansatz
H1(t,p, q) =H11(t, q
x, qz)x2 +H12(t, q
y) y2 +H13(t, q
x, qy, qz)x y . (32)
Insert (32) into (29), collect terms proportional to x2, y2, x y, and equate each term to zero
to obtain expressions for H11, H12, H13.
Proposition 7. We have the following representation for H11, H12, H13:
H11(t, q
x, qz) = −
∫ T
t
e(2µx+σ
2
x) (u−t) 1
2
σ2x Et,qx,qz
[(
∂xH0 (u,Q
x
u,Q
z
u)
)2]
du , (33a)
H12(t, q
y) = −
∫ T
t
e(2µy+σ
2
y) (u−t) 1
2
σ2y Et,qy
[(
∂yH0 (u,Q
y
u)
)2]
du , (33b)
H13(t, q) = −
∫ T
t
e(µx+µy+ρ σx σy) (u−t)
× ρ σx σy Et,qx,qy ,qz
[(
∂xH0 (u,Q
x
u,Q
z
u)
)(
∂yH0 (u,Q
y
u)
)]
du .
(33c)
Proof. Substitute (32) into (29) and equate x2 terms to zero, then H11(t, q
x, qz) satisfies
0 = ∂tH11 + (2µx + σ
2
x)H11 −
∑
k∈{x,z}
(x− ∂qkH0)
2 ak x
∂qkH11
+
∑
k∈{x,z},i=±
∫
R+
∆k,−it,X ,p,q,rH11 λ
k,i F k,i(dr)− 1
2
σ2x (∂xH0)
2 ,
(34)
with terminal condition H11(T, q
x, qz) = 0. Then, use the Feynman-Kac Theorem to show that
(33a) is a solution to the equation above. Similarly, we equate to zero the terms proportional
to y2 and x y and obtain the functions H12 and H13. 
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Proposition 8. Let H(t,X ,p, q) be as in the expansion (27), then the residual function
ε(t,p, q) satisfies the PIDE
0 = (∂t + Lp +
4∑
i=1
Bi) ε+
∑
k∈{x,y,z},i=±
∫
R+
(
∆k,−it,X ,p,q,rε
)
λk,i F k,i(dr) + fε(t,p, q) , (35)
with terminal condition ε(T,p, q) = 0, and where the operators are defined as
B1 ε =
∑
k∈{x,y,z}
1
4 ak k̂
(∂qkε)
2 , (36a)
B2 ε = −
∑
k∈{x,y,z}
1
2 ak k̂
(
k̂ − ∂qk(H0 + ϕH1)
)
∂qkε , (36b)
B3 ε = − 12 ϕ [Dε]ᵀ ρDε , (36c)
B4 ε = − ϕ [D(H0 + ϕH1)]ᵀ ρDε , (36d)
fε(t,p, q) =ϕ
2
 ∑
k∈{x,y,z}
1
4 ak k̂
(∂qkH1)
2 −DHᵀ0 ρDH1 − 12 ϕDHᵀ1 ρDH1
 . (36e)
Proof. Substitute expansion (27) into (21) and collect powers of ϕ, and obtain (35) because
H0 satisfies (11) and H1 satisfies (29). 
We observe that (35) is a semilinear PIDE, and
B1 ε = sup
ν
Lνε , B3 ε = inf
κ
Lκε ,
where
Lνε =
∑
k∈{x,y,z}
[
− ak k̂ (νk)2 − (∂qkε) νk
]
, Lκε = κᵀDε+ 1
2ϕ
κᵀ ρ−1 κ ,
and the extremes are achieved at
νk,∗ = 1
2 ak k̂
(−∂qkε) and κ∗ = −ϕ
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
] [
σx x (∂xε)
σy y (∂yε)
]
. (37)
The PIDE in (35) is the HJBI equation of the stochastic control problem:
ε(t,p, q) = sup
ν
inf
κ
EQ(κ)t,p,q
[∫ T
t
gε(pu,νu) +
1
2ϕ
(κu)
ᵀ ρ−1 κu + fε(u,pu,qu) du
]
, (38)
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where
gε(p,ν) =
∑
k∈{x,y,z}
(−ak) k̂ (νk)2 , (39)
and pu = (Xu,Yu), qu = (q
x
u, q
y
u, q
z
u) are auxiliary processes that satisfy the SDEs:
dXt = Xt (µx dt+ σx κ
x
t dt+ σx dW
x,κ
t ) + µ̂x(t,pt,qt) dt , (40)
dYt = Yt (µy dt+ σy κ
y
t dt+ σy dW
y,κ
t ) + µ̂y(t,pt,qt) dt , (41)
dqkt = β̂k(t,pt,qt, ν
k
t ) dt−
∫
R
rJk,−(dr, dt) +
∫
R
rJk,+(dr, dt) , k ∈ {x, y, z} , (42)
with the functions
Hϕ = H0 + ϕH1 ,
µ̂x(t,p, q) = −ϕ
(
σ2x x
2 ∂xHϕ + ρ σx σy x y ∂yHϕ
)
(t,p, q) ,
µ̂y(t,p, q) = −ϕ
(
σ2y y
2 ∂yHϕ + ρ σx σy x y ∂xHϕ
)
(t,p, q) ,
β̂k(t,p, q, ν
k) = − 1
2 ak k̂
(
k̂ − ∂qkHϕ(t,p, q)
)
− νk ,
and initial conditions X0, Y0, Q
x
0 , Q
y
0, Q
z
0.
Suppose the optimal processes (ν∗t ,κ
∗
t ,p
∗
u,q
∗
u)t∈[0,T ] are admissible, then (38) is indeed
ε(t,p, q) = EQ(κ
∗)
t,p,q
[∫ T
t
gε(p
∗
u,ν
∗
u) +
1
2ϕ
(κ∗u)
ᵀ ρ−1 κ∗u + fε(u,p
∗
u,q
∗
u) du
]
. (43)
In addition, here we assume ε is O(ϕ1+r) for some r > 0. Then, because of the initial
data, we have (p∗t )t∈[0,T ] and (q
∗
t )t∈[0,T ] are O(1). By (37) we have (ν
∗
t )t∈[0,T ] is O(ϕ
1+r) and
(κ∗t )t∈[0,T ] is O(ϕ
2+r). By (39) and (36e), the first, second, and third terms of the integrand
in (43) are O(ϕ2+2 r), O(ϕ3+2 r), and O(ϕ2), respectively. Thus, the term ε should be O(ϕ2),
which is consistent with our assumption that O(ϕ1+r) for some r > 0.
Next, insert (27) into the optimal trading speeds (25) and write
νk,∗ = 1
2 ak k̂
[
(k̂ − ∂qkH0)− ϕ∂qkH1 − ∂qkε
]
, (44)
so the optimal measure that arises from ambiguity aversion (26) is characterized by
κ∗ = −ϕ
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
] [
σx x (∂xH0 + ϕ∂xH1 + ∂xε)
σy y (∂yH0 + ϕ∂yH1 + ∂yε)
]
. (45)
Thus, we approximate the optimal controls ν∗ and κ∗ with
ν˜k,∗ = 1
2 ak k̂
[
(k̂ − ∂qkH0)− ϕ∂qkH1
]
and κ˜∗ = −ϕ
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
] [
σx x (∂xH0 + ϕ∂xH1)
σy y (∂yH0 + ϕ∂yH1)
]
.
(46)
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We observe that the speeds of trading in (46) exhibit cross effects. The coefficient of
ambiguity aversion parameter ϕ depends on the price and inventory of each pair in the triplet.
In the limit ϕ ↓ 0 we recover the ambiguity neutral trading speeds (14).
The proposition below provides trading speeds when the strategy in (46) approaches the
terminal date, the liquidation penalty is very large, and the broker does not fill orders from
her pool of clients. In such a case, the strategy consists of TWAP and a term that arises from
ambiguity aversion that shows the explicit cross-dependence between the liquidation speed in
a pair and the inventory position in the three currency pairs.
Proposition 9. If the broker does not fill any orders from her clients, i.e., λk,± = 0, then
the trading strategy in (46) remains admissible in the limit αk → +∞ (for k ∈ {x, y, z}).
Moreover, close to the end of the trading horizon, the trading speed can be expressed as
lim
αk→+∞ ,
k∈{x,y,z}
ν˜k,∗t =
Qk,ν˜
∗
t
T − t
(
1 + ϕσk̂ Ck̂(Xt, Yt, Q
x,ν˜∗
t , Q
y,ν˜∗
t , Q
z,ν˜∗
t )
)
+ o(T − t) , (47)
where
Cx(x, y, q
x, qy, qz) =σx
[
ax x (q
x)2 + az x (q
z)2
]
+ ρ σy ay y (q
y)2 ,
Cy(x, y, q
x, qy, qz) = ρ σx
[
ax x (q
x)2 + az x (q
z)2
]
+ σy ay y (q
y)2 ,
(48)
and Cx + Cy ≥ 0 for any x, y, qx, qy, qz, and recall that k̂ = k 1{k∈{x,y}} + x 1{k=z}.
For a proof see Appendix D.
5. Performance of strategy
In this section we employ simulations to show the performance of the strategy, where we
employ the trading speed in (46). We choose the following triplet of currency pairs: (NZD,
USD), (AUD, USD), (NZD, AUD). In our notation, USD is currency 1, NZD is currency 2,
and AUD is currency 3. Therefore, we denote the mid-exchange rate for the three pairs by
Xt, Yt, and Zt respectively. Historically, in this triplet, the pair (AUD, USD) is the most
liquid, followed by (NZD, USD), and the least liquid pair of the triplet is (NZD, AUD).
The broker trades in lots of currency pairs. Each lot consists of 106 currency pairs. The
initial lot position is Qx0 = 0 , Q
y
0 = 0 , Q
z
0 = 200, the trading window is T = 1 hour and we
run 10,000 simulations.
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σx × 10−3 σy × 10−3 σz × 10−3 ρ µx × 10−4 µy × 10−4 µz × 10−4 XNZD,USD0 Y AUD,USD0 ZNZD,AUD0
P˜ 1.70 1.56 1.02 0.78 -6.491659 -3.155159 -3.299338 0.7459 0.7678 0.9715
P 1.70 1.56 1.08 0.78 0 0 0.003650 0.7459 0.7678 0.9715
Table 1: Parameter estimates and reference measure
Statistical measure. We assume that under the (true) statistical measure, denoted by P˜,
the dynamics of the pairs x, y, z satisfy the SDEs
dXt = µ˜xXt dt+ σ˜xXt dW˜
x
t , (49)
dYt = µ˜y Yt dt+ σ˜y Yt dW˜
y
t , (50)
dZt = µ˜z Zt dt+ σ˜x Zt dW˜
x
t − σ˜y Zt dW˜ yt , (51)
where, by no-arbitrage,
µ˜z = µ˜x − µ˜y + σ˜2y − ρ˜ σ˜x σ˜y , (52)
and where W˜ x = (W˜ xt )t∈[0,T ] and W˜
y = (W˜ yt )t∈[0,T ] are P˜-Brownian motions. Moreover,
d[W˜ x, W˜ y]t = ρ˜ dt. Here, µ˜x, µ˜y, ρ˜, σ˜x > 0, σ˜y > 0 are constants, which are not necessarily
the same as those above in the reference model.
Parameter estimates and reference measure. We use FX data from HistData.com to
obtain the parameters of the mid-exchange rate dynamics under statistical measure: µ˜k, σ˜k,
k = {x, y, z}, and ρ˜. We employ data between the trading hours 00:00 am to 13:59 pm
Easter Standard time (without daylight savings adjustment), on the 8th of September, 2016.
The first row of Table 1 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of parameters used to
simulate mid-exchange rates under the statistical measure P˜. The second row of the table
shows the parameters used by the broker under the reference measure P. These parameters
are obtained by assuming that µk = 0, σk = σ˜k, k = {x, y}, ρ = ρ˜, and the parameters µz,
σz are determined by the no-arbitrage condition (1). The time unit is hours.
Other model parameters. We do not have access to limit order book data and market
order activity. These data are useful to estimate the impact of orders on exchange rates, and
to estimate the arrival rate and size of liquidity taking orders – see Gould et al. (2016) for a
recent study of order flow in FX markets. Thus, for illustrative purposes we assume that the
temporary impact on the mid-exchange rate for the three pairs is
ax = 5× 10−8 , ay = 1× 10−8 , az = 1× 10−7 .
Here we assume that the most liquid pair is that with the deepest limit order book (i.e.,
everything else being equal, it shows the smallest temporary price impact), followed by the
second most liquid, and finally, the illiquid pair shows the shallowest book, i.e., highest
temporary price impact.
Brokerage service fees are given by
c±x =
1
2
ax , c
±
y =
1
2
ay , c
±
z =
1
2
az ,
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Figure 2: Inventory paths for currency pairs, ϕ = 0.1. The solid line is the mean of all simulated paths.
and the terminal liquidation penalty parameters are αk = ak × 106.
We assume that the sizes of clients’ orders are exponentially distributed with mean θ±.
The arrival rates and expected sizes of the clients’ orders are given by
λx,± = 60 , λy,± = 90 , λz,± = 6 ; θx,± = 2 , θy,± = 1 , θz,± = 10 .
5.1. Behavior of strategy
Figure 2 shows three inventory paths for each pair and shows the mean inventory path
(solid black line) for the 10,000 simulations for each pair when the broker’s degree of ambiguity
aversion is ϕ = 0.1. In the figure, the first picture corresponds to the very liquid pair (AUD,
USD), followed by the picture for the liquid pair (NZD,USD), and the last picture is for the
illiquid pair. We first discuss the mean inventory paths and then discuss individual paths.
At the beginning of the trading window, the mean inventory paths for the very liquid and
liquid pairs show how the strategy builds a short position in both pairs while the position
in the illiquid pair is gradually liquidated. The initial short positions in the very liquid and
illiquid pairs are built to compensate for the broker’s initial long position in the illiquid pair.
At some point the (mean) strategy reverses the direction of trading in the two liquid pairs
because the short positions must be closed by the terminal time. As expected, the strategy
relies more on the very liquid currency pair because trades in this pair have the smallest
adverse impact in the quote currency received by the broker.
The sample inventory paths in Figure 2 show how individual simulations deviate from the
mean behavior of the strategy as a result from the broker filling clients’ orders. For example,
the red dash-dot line in the middle picture shows that early on, the strategy changes from
selling the pair (NZD,USD) to purchasing it – instead of building a short position in the
pair (NZD, USD) as shown in the mean path. For that path we also see that the inventory
qNZD,USD crosses zero a number of times before reaching the terminal date. This optimal
behavior becomes clear by looking at the speeds of trading and the broker’s activity with her
pool of clients, both of which we discuss below.
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Figure 3: Trading speed for each currency pair, ϕ = 0.1. Solid line represents the mean trading speed over
all paths.
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Figure 4: Buy order flow from broker’s clients, ϕ = 0.1. Solid line is mean over all paths.
Figure 3 shows the optimal speeds of trading for the triplet. As above, the solid black line
represents the average over 10,000 simulations. Recall that if the continuous rate of trading
νk is positive, then the strategy is selling the pair k. As already discussed, the strategy relies
more on trading the most liquid pair (AUD,USD) because it exhibits the lowest temporary
impact on the mid-exchange rate.
A number of factors determines the speed at which the strategy trades the pairs; one of
which is the exogenous order flow from clients. Every time the broker fills a client’s order, the
inventory in that pair jumps, and this causes the optimal speed of trading in the three pairs
to change. There are cases in which the size of the client’s order is large enough to reverse
the direction of the broker’s trading in that pair, i.e., the speed νk changes sign.
Figure 4 shows buy order flow (in the interest of space we do not show sell order flow) from
the pool of clients which are filled by the broker. At the beginning of the trading window,
the broker quickly fills around 20 lots of the currency pair (NZD,USD), which is above the
average fills shown by the solid line in the second picture of the figure. Thus, the broker’s
inventory qNZD,USD drops very quickly and the speed at which the broker sells that pair in
the Exchange also decreases.
The broker’s degree of ambiguity aversion also affects the speeds of trading. When the
broker is ambiguous to the drift of the mid-exchange rates, the trading strategy assumes that
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the dynamics of the rates are given by (17a), (17b), (17c), which for convenience we repeat
here
dXt = Xt
(
σx κ
x,∗
t dt+ σx dW
x,κ∗
t
)
,
dYt = Yt
(
σy κ
y,∗
t dt+ σy dW
y,κ∗
t
)
,
dZt = Zt
(
(µz + σz κ
z,∗
t ) dt+ σz dW
z,κ∗
t
)
,
where
κz,∗t =
σx κ
x,∗
t − σy κy,∗t√
σ2x + σ
2
y − 2 ρ σx σy
and dW z,κ
∗
t =
(
σx dW
x,κ∗
t − σy dW y,κ
∗
t
)
√
σ2x + σ
2
y − 2 ρ σx σy
. (53)
In Figure 5 we show the drift adjustments κx,∗t , κ
y,∗
t , κ
z,∗
t that stem from ambiguity aversion.
For each mid-exchange rate, the black solid line shows the mean of the drift adjustment for
all the simulations. For the three pairs, the mean of κk,∗ is always negative and gradually
increases to zero by the end of the trading window. When the drift adjustment is negative,
the strategy assumes that the mid-exchange rate is decreasing (on average), and therefore it
is optimal to sell the pair. Thus, everything else being equal, the effect of ambiguity aversion
is to increase the speed of trading.
To gain insights into the effect of ambiguity aversion on the broker’s optimal strategy
we also discuss the results of the strategy if, everything else being equal, the broker’s initial
inventory is Qx0 = 0 , Q
y
0 = 0 , Q
z
0 = −200, i.e., the initial position in the illiquid pair is short
200 contracts. The equivalent to Figures 2, and 3, which describe the inventory, and speed
of trading, are similar to those above but with the opposite sign. For example, the mean
inventory paths for the two liquid pairs show that the strategy builds long positions and
gradually unwinds them.
Similarly, the drift adjustment when the broker’s initial inventory is Qx0 = 0 , Q
y
0 = 0 , Q
z
0 =
200 is as that shown in Figure 5, but with the opposite sign. That is, for all three pairs, the
mean adjustment κk,∗ is positive and gradually decays to zero as the strategy approaches the
terminal date.
Therefore, when the broker’s initial position in the illiquid pair is short (resp. long), the
ambiguity averse broker devises a strategy where the drift in the mid-exchange rates, relative
to the model under the reference measure P, is larger (resp. smaller). In the two cases
discussed above (Qz0 = −200 and Qz0 = 200), the drift of the pairs x and y is zero under
the reference measure and the drift adjustment under the optimal measure is positive (resp.
negative) if the initial position in the illiquid pair is short (resp. long). Hence, ambiguity
aversion increases the speed at which the strategy enters positions in the liquid pairs of
the triplet. The magnitude of the increase in the speed is linear in the ambiguity aversion
parameter ϕ.
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Figure 5: Drift adjustments as result of ambiguity aversion, ϕ = 0.1. Solid line is mean over all paths.
5.2. Added value of trading all pairs in the triplet
The left panel in Figure 6 shows the profit and loss (P&L) of the strategy when the broker
trades in the triplet (gray-fill histogram) or trades only the illiquid pair (white-fill histogram).
For comparative purposes, when the broker trades the triplet of currency pairs, we assume
that she also trades with her clients, so λx,± = 60, λy,± = 90, λz,± = 6, and ϕ = 0.1. When
the broker only trades the illiquid pair we employ the parameters λx,± = 0, λy,± = 0, λz,± = 6,
and ϕ = 0.1 The mean P&L of the strategy that trades in the triplet is higher (solid vertical
line) than the P&L of the strategy when only the illiquid pair is traded (dash vertical line)
– the difference is approximately 88.88 USD per lot of currency 1. The mean P&L when the
broker only trades the illiquid pair is 7.4562×105, and when the broker trades in all the pairs
the mean P&L is 7.4571× 105.
The right panel in Figure 6 shows the mean P&L against the standard deviation of the
P&L of the strategy for ϕ ∈ [0, 50] and λx,± = 60, λy,± = 90, λz,± = 6. The lowest mean
P&L, which also corresponds to the highest standard deviation of the P&L, corresponds to
ϕ = 0, i.e., when the broker does not doubt the reference model. As the value of the ambiguity
aversion parameter ϕ increases, the mean P&L increases and the standard deviation of P&L
decreases up to a point (ϕ = 36) after which the mean P&L starts to decrease. Thus, there is
a range of the ambiguity aversion parameter where increasing the broker’s ambiguity aversion
improves the tradeoff between mean and standard deviation of the profitability of the strategy.
To investigate the additional value that stems from the opportunity to trade two liquid
currency pairs, we assume the broker does not trade with her clients, i.e., λx,± = λy,± =
λz,± = 0, and define the relative improvement of P&L as
∆PnL% =
PnLϕ − PnL0
PnL0
,
where PnL0 and PnLϕ are the P&L with ϕ = 0 and ϕ > 0, respectively. We compute a
1Recall that if ϕ > 0 the broker finds it optimal to trade in all currency pairs regardless of the initial
inventory in each pair.
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‘Sharpe ratio’ of the relative improvement of the P&L as follows:
S∆PnL% =
EP˜ [∆PnL%]√
V arP˜ [∆PnL%]
.
The left-hand picture of Figure 7 shows log(1 +S∆PnL%) against log(1 +ϕ) for ϕ ∈ [0, 50].
When ϕ = 0, we see that ∆PnL% ≡ 0, i.e., the broker does not doubt the reference model
and only trades in the illiquid pair. As the level of ambiguity aversion increases, the Sharpe
ratio increases and then decreases. Thus, there is a range of ϕ where increasing the broker’s
ambiguity aversion improves the tradeoff between mean and standard deviation of the value
of trading liquid pairs relative to trading the illiquid pair alone – the maximum Sharpe ratio
is 0.3421 for ϕ = 16.
The right-hand picture of Figure 7 shows the probability that relative P&L improvement
is greater than x, i.e. P∆PnL%(x) = P˜ (∆PnL% > x× 10−2). When ϕ = 0, the relative P&L
improvement has a point probability mass of 1 at 0. The dotted curve is for ϕ = 0.1, and
the solid curve is for ϕ = 16. For both curves, the probability of positive relative P&L
improvement is around 60%. The ∆PnL% has 50
th-percentiles equal to 0.01% and 0.03% for
ϕ = 0.1 and ϕ = 16, respectively. Thus, when the broker trades liquid pairs, she achieves
(compared with the results obtained when the broker only trades the illiquid pair) a higher
P&L of 74.59 USD (ϕ = 0.1) and 223.77 USD (ϕ = 16) in half of the 10,000 trade simulations.
5.3. Sensitivity to terminal penalty and ambiguity aversion
In addition to Proposition 9, to illustrate the effect of the terminal liquidation penalty
on: inventory, trading speed, and drift adjustment, we perform additional simulations. We
assume that the broker does not trade with her pool of clients (λk,± = 0) and employs the
following terminal liquidation penalties: αk = 1 × ak, αk = 2.5 × ak, and αk = 106 × ak,
k ∈ {x, y, z}.
Figure 8 shows average inventory paths for each currency pair when ϕ = 0.1 and initial
inventory Qx0 = Q
y
0 = 0, Q
z
0 = 200. As expected, as the value of the terminal liquidation
penalty decreases, the strategy first sells and then buys the two liquid pairs (AUD, USD),
(NZD, USD), and sells the pair (NZD, AUD) throughout the trading period. Finally, when
the value of the liquidation penalty is sufficiently low, it is optimal for the strategy to have
non-zero inventories at the end of trading of the trading horizon.
Figure 9 shows the average of the trading speed for each currency pair. As the value of
the liquidation penalty parameter decreases we observe the following: the broker is willing
to hold more inventory; the sell (buy) speed increases (decreases) in approximately the first
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(second) half of the trading period for the liquid pairs (AUD,USD) and (NZD,USD); and the
sell speed decreases for the illiquid pair (NZD, AUD).
Figure 10 shows the average drift adjustment, which is a result of the broker’s ambiguity
aversion, for each currency pair for various levels of the terminal penalty parameter. Observe
that at the beginning of the trading horizon, the impact of the terminal liquidation penalty
on the drift adjustment is very small. As time evolves, the effect of the terminal penalty
differs for each currency pair. For example, the mean drift adjustment for the pair (NZD,
AUD) is negative during the entire trading horizon, so it is always optimal to sell. Recall that
the initial inventory in the pair (NZD, AUD) is 200 lots, so the impact of the negative drift
adjustment on the strategy is to sell quicker than otherwise.
Figure 11 shows the P&L of a strategy when αk = 1 × ak (white-fill histogram) and
αk = 10
6 × ak (gray-fill histogram), and λk,± = 0, k ∈ {x, y, z}. The mean and standard
deviation of the P&L for the strategies where the terminal liquidation penalty is low are
7.4272 × 105 and 501.96 USD respectively. When the terminal liquidation penalty is large,
the mean and standard deviation of the P&L per lot are 7.4571 × 105 and 496.05 USD,
respectively. The average cost of executing large inventories at time T is 2.9922× 103 USD.2
Finally, we investigate the behavior of the optimal strategy when the value of the ambiguity
aversion parameter is high. We let ϕ ∈ {0.1, 1, 10} and assume that the broker ensures full
liquidation by the end of the terminal horizon, so αk = 10
6 × ak, k ∈ {x, y, z} and λk,± = 0,
k ∈ {x, y, z}, i.e., the broker does not trade with her pool of clients. Below, in Figures 12,
13, 14, the black, blue, and red solid lines represent cases of ϕ = 0.1, 1, 10, respectively.
Figure 12 shows the average inventory paths for the three currency pairs. Figure 13 shows
average trading speeds in the currency pairs. Finally, Figure 14 shows the average of the drift
adjustment for each currency pair.
6. Conclusions
We showed how a broker executes a large position in an illiquid foreign exchange currency
pair. The broker’s strategy considers taking positions on two other more liquid currency pairs.
These additional pairs are chosen to form a triplet where, by no arbitrage, one of the pairs
2We compute the costs of unwinding terminal inventory as follows. Let QkT represent the outstanding
inventory at the terminal time T , and let ∆T be the time interval to unwind Q
k
T . The contribution to the
P&L of unwinding the inventory is∑
k∈{x,y,z}
QkT ×max
(
K̂T
(
1− ak Q
k
T
∆T
)
, 0
)
, (54)
where K̂T = XT 1{k∈{x,z}}+YT 1{k=y} and ∆T = 10−3 hours, which is the time step we use in the simulations.
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ϕ. Right panel: The probability of relative P&L improvement greater than a given value x in percentage, the
dotted line is for ϕ = 0.1 and the solid line is for ϕ = 16.
becomes redundant.
When the broker is ambiguity neutral, i.e., fully trusts the reference model, the optimal
strategy in each currency pair is independent of the inventory held in the other two pairs.
Thus, the ambiguity neutral broker’s strategy is to liquidate each pair independently from the
other pairs. On the contrary, when the broker makes her model robust to misspecification,
we show that the optimal trading strategy in each currency pair is affected by the inventory
holdings in the other two pairs.
We use simulations to compare the tradeoff between mean and standard deviation of the
Profit and Loss (P&L) of the optimal liquidation strategy. We show that when the broker
makes her model robust to model misspecification the mean P&L of the strategy increases and
the standard deviation of the P&L decreases (for a range of ambiguity aversion parameter).
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Figure 8: Average inventory over all simulated paths for currency pairs, ϕ = 0.1, λk,± = 0, k ∈ {x, y, z}. The
blue, red, black solid lines are for αk = 1× ak, αk = 2.5× ak, and αk = 106 × ak, k ∈ {x, y, z}, respectively.
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Appendices
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We show that H can be solved analytically and it takes the form (13). First, the
supremum in (11a) is obtained point-wise by
νk,∗ =
k̂ ∂XH − ∂qkH
2 ak k̂ ∂XH
, for k ∈ {x, y, z} and k̂ = k 1{k∈{x,y}} + x 1{k=z} .
Substituting the form (13) into the above leads to
νk,∗ = 1
2 ak
(hk1(t) + 2h
k
2(t) q
k). (55)
Substituting the feedback control (55) and (13) into (11a) we obtain a new equation which is
closed under the form of the solution (13). Collecting the x (qx)2, y (qy)2 and x (qz)2 terms,
we find the ODEs
− ∂thk2 + 1ak (h
k
2)
2 − µk̂ hk2 = 0 , (56)
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Figure 10: Average drift adjustments over all simulated paths as result of ambiguity aversion, ϕ = 0.1, and
no trades with broker’s clients, λk,± = 0, k ∈ {x, y, z}. The blue, red, black solid lines are for αk = 1 × ak,
αk = 2.5× ak, and αk = 106 × ak, k ∈ {x, y, z}, respectively.
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edge white fill is P&L for αk = 1× ak; and the plot with gray edge and fill is P&L for αk = 106 × ak, where
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with terminal conditions hk2(T ) = αk. These ODEs have the explicit solutions
hk2(t) =

(
1− υk e−µk̂(T−t)
)−1
ak µk̂ , µk̂ 6= 0 ,(
α−1k + a
−1
k (T − t)
)−1
, µk̂ = 0 ,
(57)
with constant υk := (1− akαk µk̂).
Next, collecting x qx, y qy and x qz terms, and setting θk,± :=
∫
R+ r F
k,±(dr), we have
− ∂thk1 + µk̂(1− hk1) + 1ak h
k
2 h
k
1 − 2 γk− hk2 = 0 , (58)
with terminal conditions hk1(T ) = 0, and γ
k
− := (λ
k,+θk,+ − λk,−θk,−). These equations admit
the explicit solutions
hk1(t) =

(
1− υk e−µk̂ (T−t)
)−1 {
(1− 2 ak γk−)µk̂ (t− T ) + υk (1− e−µk̂ (T−t))
}
, µk̂ 6= 0,
2 γk−
(
α−1k + a
−1
k (T − t)
)−1
(T − t) , µk̂ = 0 .
(59)
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Figure 12: Average inventory over all simulated paths for three currency pairs, αk = 10
6 × ak, λk,± = 0,
k ∈ {x, y, z}. The red, blue, black solid lines are for ϕ = 10, ϕ = 1, and ϕ = 0.1 respectively.
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Figure 13: Average trading speed over all simulated paths for each currency pair, αk = 10
6 × ak, λk,± = 0,
k ∈ {x, y, z}. The red, blue, black solid lines are for ϕ = 10, ϕ = 1, and ϕ = 0.1 respectively. The horizontal
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Finally, collecting x and y terms, and let ηk,± :=
∫
R+ r
2 F k,±(dr), we have
0 = −(∂t + µx)hx0 + ψx + ψz − γx− hx1(t)− γz− hz1(t)− δx hx2(t)− δz hz2(t)
+ 1
4ax
(hx1)
2 + 1
4az
(hz1)
2 ,
(60a)
0 = −(∂t + µy)hy0 + ψy − γy− hy1(t)− δy hy2(t) + 14ay (h
y
1)
2 , (60b)
with terminal conditions hx0(T ) = h
y
0(T ) = 0, and constants δ
k := (λk,+ηk,+ + λk,−ηk,−) and
ψk := (c−k λ
k,− ηk,− + c+k λ
k,+ ηk,+). These ODEs can be solved by quadratures and are given
by
hx0(t) =
∑
`∈{x,z}
{
h`1(t) + h
`
2(t) + h
`
3(t) + h
`
4(t)
}
, (61a)
hy0(t) = h
y
1(t) + h
y
2(t) + h
y
3(t) + h
y
4(t) , (61b)
where, for all µk̂
hk1(t) = −
∫ T
t
eµk̂ (u−t) ψk du , hk2(t) =
∫ T
t
eµk̂ (u−t) γk− h
k
1(u) du ,
hk3(t) =
∫ T
t
eµk̂ (u−t) δk hk2(u) du , h
k
4(t) = −
∫ T
t
eµk̂ (u−t) 1
4 ak
(
hk1(u)
)2
du .
(62)

B. Proof of Theorem 2
Since (13) is classical, we only need to check that the controls (14) are admissible. To
check that ν∗ is admissible, it suffices to show that EP[
∫ t
0
(Qk,ν
∗
u )
2 du] < +∞ because νk,∗ is
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affine in Qk,ν
∗
. It further suffices to show EP[(Qk,ν
∗
t )
2] < +∞ on t ∈ [0, T ].
From (4), we have
Qk,ν
∗
t = Q
k,ν∗
0 −
∫ t
0
1
2 ak
(
hk1(u) + 2h
k
2(u)Q
ν∗,k
u
)
du−Ok,−t +Ok,+t . (63)
Use the integrating factor pikt := e
1
ak
∫ t
0 h
k
2(s)ds to find
Qk,ν
∗
t = Q
k,ν∗
0
pik0
pikt
− 1
2ak
∫ t
0
piku
pikt
hk1(u) du+
∫ t
0
piku
pikt
(dOk,+u − dOk,−u ) . (64)
From (57) we see that hk2(t) does not change sign on the interval t ∈ [0, T ]. Next, if
0 < µk̂ < αk/ak, then ∃ C0 > C1 > 0, s.t. hk2(t) =
(
C0 − C1 e−µk̂ (T−t)
)−1
. Hence, by explicit
integration, pikt = e
C2t
(
C3 − C4 e−µk̂ (T−t)
)C5
, where C2 = 1/ak C0 > 0, C3 = C0/(C0 −
C1e
−µ
k̂
T ) > C4 = C1/(C0 − C1e−µk̂ T ) > 0, C5 = −1/ak µk̂ C0 < 0.
Next, by Ito’s isometry for jump processes, we have
EP
[(∫ t
0
piku
pikt
dOk,±u
)2]
≤
∫ t
0
(
piku
pikt
)2
λk,±θk,± du <∞ , ∀0 ≤ t ≤ T , (65)
where the last inequality follows because C3 > C4 and therefore pi
k
t remains bounded on the
domain t ∈ [0, T ]. Similar arguments hold when −αk/ak < µk̂ < 0.
When µk̂ = 0, from (57), we have h
k
2(t) =
(
α−1k + a
−1
k (T − t)
)−1
. Hence, by explicit
integration, pikt =
(
α−1k + a
−1
k (T − t)
)−1 (
α−1k + a
−1
k T
)
. We have the analogous inequality
(65). Hence the result follows. 
C. Proof of Proposition 3
We proof the case µk̂ 6= 0 (µk̂ = 0 is similar). From (57) and (59) we have
lim
αk→+∞
hk2(t) =
(
1− e−µk̂(T−t))−1 ak µk̂ ,
and
lim
αk→+∞
hk1(t) =
(
1− e−µk̂ (T−t))−1 (1− 2 ak γk−)µk̂ (t− T ) + 1 .
Then
lim
t→T
{(
1− e−µk̂(T−t))−1 ak µk̂} (T − t) = ak ,
and
lim
t→T
(
1− e−µk̂ (T−t))−1 (1− 2 ak γk−)µk̂ (t− T ) + 1 = 2 ak γk− .
32
From (55), as αk → +∞ and T − t 1, we obtain
lim
αk→+∞
νk,∗t = (T − t)−1Qk,ν
∗
t + γ
k
− + o(T − t) , (66)
recall γk− = (λ
k,+θk,+ − λk,−θk,−) and θk,± := ∫R+ r F k,±(dr).
The SDE of the inventory process is
dQk,ν
∗
u = −
[
(T − u)−1Qk,ν∗u + γk−
]
du+ d(Ok,+u −Ok,−u ) + o(T − t) , u ∈ [t, T ] , (67)
which has solution
Qk,ν
∗
s =
T − s
T − t Q
k,ν∗
t +
∫ s
t
T − s
T − u
[
d(Ok,+u −Ok,−u )− γk− du
]
+ o(T − t) , s ∈ [t, T ] . (68)
As s → T the controlled inventory Qk,ν∗s vanishes. In other words, the strategy guarantees
that the broker completely liquidates her position by maturity.
If we substitute Qk,ν
∗
s given in (68) into (66), the speed of trading becomes
νk,∗s =
Qk,ν
∗
t
T − t +
∫ s
t
1
T − u
[
d(Ok,+u −Ok,−u )− γk− du
]
+
γk−
T − s + o(T − t) , s ∈ [t, T ] , (69)
and if we assume that the expected order flow from clients γk− 6= 0, it is easy to see that the
broker’s speed of trading is infinitely fast close to maturity. Let γk− = 0. Then, the speed of
trading becomes
νk,∗s =
Qk,ν
∗
t
T − t +
∫ s
t
1
T − u (dO
k,+
u − λk,+θk,+du)−
∫ s
t
1
T − u (O
k,−
u − λk,−θk,−du) + o(T − t) .
Note that
E
[(∫ s
t
1
T − u (dO
k,±
u − λk,±θk,±du)
)2]
= λk,± ηk,±
(
1
T − s −
1
T − t
)
,
and recall ηk,± :=
∫
R+ r
2 F k,±(dr) > 0.
If λk,± = 0, we therefore have E
[ ∫ T
t
(νk,∗s )
2 ds
]
<∞ , and hence, in this case, the strategy
is admissible, and from (68) we see that the broker completely liquidates her position by T .
If λk,± > 0, we have E
[ ∫ T
t
(νk,∗s )
2 ds
]
=∞, which is not an admissible strategy. 
D. Proof of Proposition 9
We prove the case µk̂ = 0, the proof is similar when µk̂ 6= 0. The control ν˜∗, given in (46)
and repeated here for convenience is
ν˜k,∗ =
k̂ − ∂qkH0
2 ak k̂
− ϕ ∂qkH1
2 ak k̂
, k ∈ {x, y, z} and k̂ = k 1{k∈{x,y}} + x 1{k=z} .
33
When λk,± = 0, the function H0 in (28) simplifies to
H0(t, x, y, q) =x q
x + y qy + x qz − hx02(t)x (qx)2 − hy02(t) y (qy)2 − hz02(t)x (qz)2 .
In the limit αk →∞ the first term in ν˜k,∗, see (57), becomes
lim
αk→+∞
k̂ − ∂qkH0
2 ak k̂
=
qk
T − t .
By (33a), (33b), (33c), we have
H11(t, q
x, qz) =
∫ T
t
− e(2µx+σ2x) (u−t)
× 1
2
σ2x Et,qx,qz
[(
Qxu + Q
z
u − hx02(u) (Qxu)2 − hz02(u) (Qzu)2
)2]
du ,
H12(t, q
y) =
∫ T
t
− e(2µy+σ2y) (u−t) 1
2
σ2y Et,qy
[(
Qyu − hy02(u) (Qyu)2
)2]
du ,
H13(t, q
x, qy, qz) =
∫ T
t
− e(µx+µy+ρ σx σy) (u−t)
× ρ σx σy Et,qx,qy ,qz
[(
Qxu + Q
z
u − hx02(u) (Qxu)2 − hz02(u) (Qzu)2
)
×
(
Qyu − hy02(u) (Qyu)2
)]
du ,
and by (31), (32), the auxiliary processes Qku, k ∈ {x, y, z} are deterministic functions of u
and satisfy
dQku = −
hk02(u)
ak
Qku du , u ∈ [t, T ] ,
with initial condition Qkt = q
k. The solution is
Qku =
ak + αk (T − u)
ak + αk (T − t) q
k .
After evaluating the integrals, taking derivatives with respect to qk, taking the limit αk →∞,
and in the limit t→ T , the second term in ν˜k,∗ becomes
lim
αk→+∞ ,
k∈{x,y,z}
−ϕ ∂qkH1
2 ak k̂
= ϕσk̂
qk
T − t Ck̂(x, y, q
x, qy, qz) + o(T − t) ,
where
Cx(x, y, q
x, qy, qz) =σx
[
ax x (q
x)2 + az x (q
z)2
]
+ ρ σy ay y (q
y)2 ,
Cy(x, y, q
x, qy, qz) = ρ σx
[
ax x (q
x)2 + az x (q
z)2
]
+ σy ay y (q
y)2 .

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